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NOTICE TO READERS
The purpose of this document is to offer guidance to audit committees in addressing the risk of fraud
through management override of internal control over financial reporting. By effectively overseeing
management and addressing the risk of management override, audit committees increase the likelihood
of preventing, deterring, and detecting fraudulent financial reporting. The guidance in this document is
applicable, in various degrees, to audit committees of publicly traded companies; nonpublic companies;
not-for-profit organizations; federal, state, and local government entities; and other entities.
This document is meant to help facilitate the audit committee’s consideration of the risk of management
override of internal controls. If the reader would like to learn more about management antifraud programs
and controls, please see the document titled Management Antifraud Programs and Controls:
Guidance to Help Prevent, Deter, and Detect Fraud.1
This document represents the views of the members of the AICPA’s Antifraud Programs and Controls
Task Force and has not been approved, disapproved, or otherwise acted on by any senior technical
committee of the AICPA. This document has no authoritative status. This publication was reviewed by
the AICPA Audit and Attest Standards staff and published by the AICPA, and is presumed to be appropriate.
1 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, Financial
Executives International, Information Systems Audit and Control Association, Institute of Internal Auditors, Institute of
Management Accountants, and Society for Human Resource Management jointly issued Management Antifraud
Programs and Controls: Guidance to Help Prevent, Deter, and Detect Fraud. That document contains specific recom-
mendations an organization's board of directors, audit committees, and management can take to prevent, deter, and
detect fraud and can be downloaded from http://www.aicpa.org/download/antifraud/SAS-99-Exhibit.pdf. The document
was also included as an exhibit to Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit (AICPA, Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316).
Copyright © 2005 by
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc.
New York, NY 10036-8775
All rights reserved. For information about the procedure for requesting permission to make copies of any part of
this work, please visit www.aicpa.org. A Permissions Request Form for e-mailing requests and information on
fees are available there by clicking on the copyright notice at the foot of the AICPA homepage. 
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The risks of fraud and management’s ability to override internal 
controls are present in every entity.
Section A: Management Override and the Audit 
Committee's Responsibilities
Even though internal control over financial reporting (hereinafter referred to as internal 
controls or simply as controls) may appear to be well-designed and effective, controls that are
otherwise effective can be overridden by management in every entity. Many financial 
statement frauds have been perpetrated by intentional override by senior management of
what might otherwise appear to be effective internal controls. Audit committees may reduce
the risk of material misstatement in the financial statements due to fraud by addressing the
risk of management override of internal controls as part of their oversight of the financial
reporting process. This document provides guidance to audit committees in considering the
risk of management override of internal controls—the Achilles’ heel of fraud prevention.
Because management is primarily responsible for the design, implementation, and 
maintenance of internal controls, the entity is always exposed to the danger of 
1
The chair of the audit committee of ControlCo was stunned. Company counsel had just
advised him that the prior year’s revenue and earnings may have been overstated. “But
how could that happen? We have good internal controls and management and the auditors
both signed off that they were effective!” he said. Ultimately, the chair learned of the
“Achilles’ heel” of any system of fraud prevention: Those who design and implement 
internal controls—management—can also override or bypass those controls. The chair
began to wonder, What might we have done differently? How can an audit committee 
prevent management from overriding internal controls? A few weeks later, as the fraud
became public, the chair felt even worse when reading the headline in the local newspaper:
“Where Was the Audit Committee?”
Then, regulators and class action lawyers begin to ask:
• Was the audit committee sufficiently involved or were the members simply listeners? 
Did the audit committee’s actions demonstrate an appropriate level of skepticism?
• Did the individual members of the audit committee carefully read the quarterly financial
statements? Did they understand the correct key performance indicators?
• Was the audit committee alert to financial statement fraud risk factors? Did the audit 
committee members focus on the potential for manipulation of financial statements?
• Were the entity’s code of conduct and whistleblowing processes really important to the
entity or was it simply an effort to comply with regulatory requirements?
• Was the audit committee making best use of the entity’s internal auditors and 
independent auditors?
management override of controls, whether the entity is publicly held, private, not-for-profit, or
governmental. When the opportunity to override internal controls is combined with powerful
incentives to meet accounting objectives, senior management may engage in fraudulent
financial reporting. Thus, otherwise effective internal controls cannot be relied upon to 
prevent, detect, or deter fraudulent financial reporting perpetrated by senior management. 
Management may override controls to intentionally misstate the nature and timing of revenue
or other transactions by (1) recording fictitious business events or transactions or changing
the timing of recognition of legitimate transactions, particularly those recorded close to the
end of an accounting period; (2) establishing or reversing reserves to manipulate results,
including intentionally biasing assumptions and judgments used to estimate account 
balances; and (3) altering records and terms related to significant or unusual transactions. 
The board of directors and its audit committee are responsible for overseeing the actions of
management. Corporate directors can no longer argue that they acted diligently in carrying
out their responsibilities if they have failed to design a strong audit committee charter and
timely perform all the functions specified therein. With respect to audit committee members,
this includes the duty to inquire into the adequacy of their corporation’s internal controls, both
in theory and in practice, and to take actions, such as those described in this document, to
minimize the possibility that internal controls are overridden by management, thereby resulting
in undetected fraud. 
An appropriate tone at the top, set by the board of directors, implementation of a code of 
conduct/ethics, training programs, expanded auditing and public reporting on the effectiveness
of internal controls now required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the Act), and enhanced
criminal penalties under the Act all may be helpful fraud deterrents, but their mere existence
will seldom provide assurance that management override can be prevented or timely detected.1
The audit committee must evaluate whether oversight mechanisms are in place and functioning
that will prevent, deter, or detect management override of internal controls. Furthermore,
recent changes in the U.S. Federal Sentencing Commission’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(Federal Sentencing Guidelines) increase expectations for antifraud programs and controls
and can serve as one useful tool in assessing the entity’s antifraud programs and controls.2
1 The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) Internal Control—Integrated
Framework states on page 6 that, “An internal control system, no matter how well conceived and operated, can 
provide only reasonable—not absolute—assurance to management and the board regarding achievement of the 
entity's objectives. The likelihood of achievement is affected by limitations inherent in all internal control systems.
These include the reality that judgments in decision-making can be faulty, and that breakdowns can occur because 
of simple error or mistake. Additionally, controls can be circumvented by collusion of two or more people, and 
management has the ability to override the system.” (Emphasis added).
2 The U.S. Federal Sentencing Commission first promulgated organizational sentencing guidelines in 1991. The 
sentencing guidelines apply to almost all types of organizations, including corporations, partnerships, unions, 
not-for-profit organizations, and trusts. One significant aspect of the sentencing guidelines is that each organization is
responsible for the wrongful acts of its employees as long as the employees were acting in their official capacity—even
if the organization did not know or approve of the employees' actions. The compliance program component has been
a vital part of the sentencing guidelines since that time. Included in the sentencing guidelines are seven minimum
requirements to be used to test the effectiveness of a compliance program.
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Section B: Actions to Address the Risk of Management 
Override of Internal Controls
Management override is very difficult to detect. However, an audit committee can take 
actions to address the risk of management override of controls. This section outlines several
actions: maintaining an appropriate level of skepticism, strengthening committee understanding
of the business, brainstorming about fraud risks, using the code of conduct to assess financial
reporting culture, ensuring the entity cultivates a vigorous whistleblower program, and 
developing a broad information and feedback network.
Maintaining Skepticism
An effective starting point for the audit committee in assessing fraud risk is the exercise of an
appropriate level of skepticism when considering the risk of management override of internal
controls. Skepticism is an attitude that acknowledges that fraud risks, including the risk of
management override, exist in every entity. An appropriate level of audit committee skepticism
requires alertness to potential fraud risk factors and a willingness to ask sometimes difficult
and perhaps even embarrassing questions. It also requires an environment that encourages
open and candid discussion among audit committee members and sufficient time to think and
consider “what if” scenarios related to the possibilities of fraud at the entity. In considering the
risk of management override of internal controls, the audit committee should set aside any
beliefs about the integrity of management because override is most often committed by “good
executives gone bad” rather than consistently dishonest people.
Appropriate skepticism by audit committee members is essential to their assessment of 
the risk of management override of internal controls. With an appropriate attitude about 
the ever-present risk of management override, audit committee members can use their 
knowledge of the business and related financial statement risks to explicitly oversee the 
risk of management override of controls. Additionally, an open display of skepticism, in
itself, can be a deterrent to management override of controls.
Strengthening Committee Understanding of the Business
Today’s audit committees need a solid knowledge of the industry and business to form the
foundation for effective oversight. Because financial reporting to stakeholders should reflect
the economic activity of the entity, industry and entity knowledge is critical for determining
whether the entity’s financial reporting is sufficient for its users. That knowledge also helps the
audit committee identify and understand business and financial risks that may increase the
likelihood of fraud. 
Most businesses plan legitimate reactions to variances from expected financial performance.
Those reactions may include either new or additional transactions, or the cancellation, reduction,
or postponement of transactions otherwise planned. For example, a business that is not meeting
its earnings goals may accelerate or delay incurring expenses. It may decide on more or fewer
new employees than planned, or it may change the pattern or timing of research and development
3
or marketing efforts. An entity facing a profit shortfall may attempt to increase sales through a
variety of means, including reducing prices, offering incentives, or expanding its sales force.
Conversely, an entity surpassing its budgeted revenues may decide to slow sales by not filling
orders for a short time to minimize overtime costs and balance customer inventory levels.
These are usually legitimate, transaction-oriented means of “managing” operations. 
When a business is unable to achieve desired results legitimately, the temptation to override
internal controls to manipulate reported results can ensue. The distinction between what is
legitimate and not legitimate is not always clear, particularly when estimates are involved or
when the accounting depends on a management decision. Understanding key earnings 
drivers and management’s planned reactions to variations from expected performance
increases the audit committee’s ability to identify situations in which management’s actions
may have crossed the line and may no longer be legitimate. Audit committees should 
consider whether transactions make sense in the context of legitimate business purposes.
Management controls the key sources of revenue and earnings volatility through the 
management of the company’s underlying business, operations, credit, and market risks.
Management also is responsible for the numerous estimates and judgments underlying
reported results. These sources include judgments on asset values, estimated liabilities, and
contingencies, to name only a few. In some cases, nonfinancial data, such as subscribers or
customers, or units sold, can be critical drivers of earnings and revenue. An audit committee
that does not understand the key drivers of earnings and revenue and fails to focus on 
related key performance indicators may not be able to properly monitor management and
may not have a reasonable chance of identifying fraud risk factors in advance of a crisis.
The identification of fraud-related incentives or pressures, opportunities, and attitudes or
rationalizations3 begins with each audit committee member obtaining a solid and complete
understanding of the business. This understanding can be used to assess fraud risk as the
audit committee evaluates press releases, analysts’ forecasts and reports, and financial
reports to shareholders. Understanding the nature of the entity’s core lines of business and
management’s compensation package may help the audit committee identify significant
incentives or opportunities for fraud. Historically, technology, telecommunication, and service
entities have been particularly vulnerable to these risks. In addition, certain industries or 
business operations are subject to accounting and financial reporting issues that are grounded
in subjective determinations. These provide an opportunity for management to perpetrate a
financial fraud. 
3 These three elements constitute the “fraud triangle.” According to generally accepted auditing standards (AU sec.
316.07):
Three conditions generally are present when fraud occurs. First, management or other employees
have an incentive or are under pressure, which provides a reason to commit fraud. Second, 
circumstances exist—for example, the absence of controls, ineffective controls, or the ability of
management to override controls—that provide an opportunity for a fraud to be perpetrated. Third,
those involved are able to rationalize committing a fraudulent act. Some individuals possess an 
attitude, character, or set of ethical values that allow them to knowingly and intentionally commit a
dishonest act. However, even otherwise honest individuals can commit fraud in an environment that
imposes sufficient pressure on them. The greater the incentive or pressure, the more likely the 
individual will be able to rationalize the acceptability of committing fraud (Emphasis added).
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A next step in identifying fraud risks involves the audit committee’s understanding of what
may threaten management’s ability to accomplish its objectives and strategies. Those threats
or risks include competition, capital constraints, major customer or vendor loss, production
issues, economic downturn, or regulatory change. They too may create incentives or 
pressures for engaging in fraud. 
It is important for the audit committee to understand the financial reporting environment (for
example, attitudes, ethics, motives, and pressures) affecting the CEO, CFO, and others who
are involved in the entity’s financial reporting. The internal reporting process between key
segments of the business (across lines of business, divisions, and geographic segments) and
senior management may also be important and worthy of audit committee inquiry. Unrealistic
performance expectations, real or perceived, have too often been the catalyst for financial
statement fraud at remote or relatively small business units. Information obtained by the audit
committee about differences in the financial reporting cultures across different units may 
signal areas within the company where fraud risks may be heightened.
It is useful to understand the process of developing, reviewing, and revising budgets, as 
well as the company’s budget “mentality.” Because the operating budget can establish the 
earnings that the company hopes to report, it may prompt management to manage earnings
when operations are not in line with expectations. For example, a budget that is intended as
an incentive to divisions and subsidiaries to reach their highest potential can create pressures
on managers to falsify reported results. An early challenge to an unrealistic budget by a well-
informed audit committee can be an effective deterrent against management override of 
controls to reach unrealistic targets.
Finally, it is always important for the audit committee to have a thorough understanding of 
the incentives and pressures management personnel face due to the entity’s incentive 
compensation programs. The ability to exercise stock options when the stock price reaches
predetermined levels and financial performance-related bonuses can be strong motivators 
for positive change but can also place intense pressure on management to “manage” 
earnings improperly.
Brainstorming to Identify Fraud Risks
Members of the audit committee can increase their effectiveness in dealing with the potential
of management override of internal controls by discussing, among themselves, the potential
for fraud. An exchange of ideas or “brainstorming” about how and where they believe the 
entity may be susceptible to fraud, what might motivate management to perpetrate fraud, 
how management might override controls to engage in and conceal fraudulent financial
reporting, and how entity assets could be misappropriated can be useful for this purpose. 
The brainstorming session’s effectiveness is increased if conducted, at least partially, in
closed or executive session without management present. 
The brainstorming session includes a consideration of known external and internal factors
affecting the entity that might (1) create incentives or pressures for management and others
to commit fraud, (2) provide the opportunity for fraud to be perpetrated, and (3) indicate a 
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culture or environment that enables management to rationalize committing fraud. An attitude
that includes a questioning mind as described above and, for this purpose, setting aside any
prior positive beliefs regarding the honesty and integrity of management increases the 
usefulness of the discussion.
Audit committee discussions with internal auditors, independent auditors, counsel, the 
compensation committee, human resources, compliance officer, marketing/sales, and 
business unit leadership may provide important input to the brainstorming session. Guidance
as to the substance of those discussions is provided later in this document.
Considering schemes used to perpetrate management fraud at other entities and the degrees
to which such schemes might occur at this entity may also increase the effectiveness of the
session. An antifraud specialist, working with the audit committee, can often enhance the
effectiveness of the brainstorming session. The appendix to this document discusses fraud
schemes and items the audit committee may consider when brainstorming to identify fraud risks.
Some initiatives that are especially important for having an effective brainstorming session
include advance preparation by participants and efforts to ensure an open and frank discussion
by all participants. A tendency in many brainstorming sessions is for the group to be overly
influenced by initial ideas of a dominant personality. As such, the group should attempt to
include ideas from all participants before determining which are most helpful. Once several
fraud risks are identified, a prioritization by the combined likelihood of occurrence and the
magnitude of impact can help focus the committee’s efforts.
Possible brainstorming agenda items include the results of whistleblower hotline calls, fraud
risk assessments performed by the company’s independent auditors, and fraud risk factors or
concerns identified by audit committee members. 
Using the Code of Conduct to Assess Financial Reporting Culture
Most organizations have a code of conduct. The mere existence of a code, however, is not
sufficient to reduce the likelihood of management override of controls.4 The audit committee
can use the code of conduct as a benchmark for assessing whether the culture or “tone at the
top” and management’s actions are those required to maintain the highest levels of integrity
under pressure and opportunity to commit fraud. The code also facilitates the reporting of
inappropriate conduct by delineating the types of conduct the organization deems unacceptable.
The audit committee should be routinely furnished with the results of any surveys of employees
regarding corporate behavior and similar information received from external parties, such as
customers and vendors. These can be excellent sources of information for the audit 
committee about the culture or “tone at the top.” Perceptions of management’s commitment to
uphold the code influence the degree to which employees and other parties follow the code
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4 As a result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 406, the Securities and Exchange Commission set rules
requiring registrants to disclose whether or not the issuer has adopted a code of ethics for its senior executive officers
and if not, why not.
and/or report violations of the code. The extent to which management is perceived to be 
committed to conduct sanctioned by the code will influence the audit committee’s ability to
deter, prevent, or detect management override of internal controls. Equally important, an 
evaluation by the audit committee of how management communicates information about the
code and motivates employees to comply with the code also provides information reflecting
the culture or attitudes about ethical behavior within the organization. Employee awareness
and training about the code may signal information about management’s commitment to the
code and indicate the likelihood that employees will report management code violations.
Conversely, a lack of awareness by employees may signal management’s lack of commitment
to ethical conduct.
Cultivating a Vigorous Whistleblower Program
A key defense against management override of internal controls is a whistleblowing process
that typically incorporates a telephone hotline. Respondents to a 2004 survey by the
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) revealed that various forms of fraud are
detected 40 percent of the time by tips, which made this the leading method for detecting
fraud.5 Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act6 requires that confidential reporting mechanisms be
made available only to employees, opening the system to suppliers, customers, and others
can increase the number of reports by approximately 50 percent.7
The audit committee can assist in creating strong antifraud controls by encouraging the 
development of a culture in which employees view whistleblowing as a valuable contribution
to an attractive workplace of integrity and their own futures. The reporting mechanisms 
must demonstrate confidentiality so potential whistleblowers are assured that their concerns
will be properly considered and that they will not be subjected to retribution. Successful
whistleblowing procedures require strong leadership from the audit committee, the board of
directors, and management. 
For the audit committee to effectively monitor the risk of management override of internal 
controls, the automatic and direct submission to the audit committee of all complaints involving
senior management (without filtering by management or other entity personnel) is essential.
The audit committee’s primary interest is complaints related to accounting, internal controls,
and auditing. 
By engaging internal auditors to periodically evaluate the design and operating effectiveness
of the hotline, the audit committee can ensure that the hotline reflects changes in the 
company’s operations and in best practices and indicate satisfactory support from management,
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5 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2004 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse (Austin, TX:
ACFE, 2004), p. 18.
6 A whistleblowing hotline is now the statutory responsibility of the audit committee and cannot simply be delegated to
entity officials. Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires that audit committees establish effective
“whistleblowing” procedures, a statutory responsibility that they did not have before.
7 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2004 Report to the Nation on Occupational Fraud and Abuse (Austin, TX:
ACFE, 2004), p. 19.
employees, and other participants. Tests and evaluations by internal auditors of whether 
protocols established for forwarding information to the audit committee have been followed
are important. A checklist of issues for audit committees to consider when evaluating the
design and operating effectiveness of the whistleblower process can be found in the Audit
Committee Effectiveness Center at www.aicpa.org/audcommctr/homepage.htm.
Developing a Broad Information and Feedback Network
Identifying situations where management has overridden internal controls is difficult because
those actions are not obvious and are not expected of a trusted management team. To
respond to that challenge, the development of an extensive information network that extends
beyond senior management may significantly increase the audit committee’s ability to detect
management override of internal controls. In addition to the financial reporting process, the
network often includes the following:
• Internal auditors
• Independent auditors
• Compensation committee
• Key employees 
The audit committee may consider meeting periodically with representatives from each of the
above groups to discuss matters affecting the financial reporting process, including significant
estimates, fraud risks, key internal controls, and any other items of concern. Inconsistencies
in information obtained from these sources may signal that management override of internal
controls is present. The information obtained from these sources may be useful to the audit
committee in its brainstorming session about the risk of management override of internal controls.
Communications With Internal Auditors
First and foremost, the internal audit department should understand that its responsibilities are
primarily to the audit committee. A strong internal audit function may also include audit committee
oversight of the internal audit group’s budget approval process and its policies regarding 
hiring, evaluation, training, and termination of internal audit staff. Terminating or transferring
high level internal audit personnel should be ultimately determined by the audit committee.
Executive sessions with the head of the internal audit function at every audit committee 
meeting provide the audit committee a unique opportunity to engage in candid discussions
with him or her about the possible risk of management override of internal controls and any
indications of improper conduct by senior management. 
The audit committee, by understanding and assisting in developing the internal auditors’
annual audit plan, will influence the internal auditors’ agenda by directing the plan’s emphasis
to areas of particular interest to the audit committee. These areas might include fraud
risks—particularly matters that surfaced during the brainstorming session—and controls over
judgments and estimates and key information processes. A properly directed internal audit
staff can serve as the “eyes and ears” of the audit committee.
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Specific inquiries might include the following:
1. What fraud risks are being monitored by the internal audit team on a periodic or regular
basis? How does internal audit address the continuous auditing of these critical risks?
2. What specific procedures does internal audit perform to address management override of
internal controls?
3. Has anything occurred that would lead internal audit to change its assessment of the risk of
management override of internal controls?
Communications With Independent Auditors
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the independent auditors be appointed by the audit committee.
As a best practice, all audit committees—even those not subject to Sarbanes-Oxley—may
consider being responsible for the appointment of the independent auditors. In this way, the
audit committee can ensure that the independent auditors report directly to the committee. 
A strong and candid relationship, including an open dialogue between the independent 
auditors and the audit committee, can provide a useful foundation for the audit committee’s
assessment of fraud risk, including the risk of management override of internal controls. 
Specific inquiries might include the following:
1. What fraud risks are independent auditors addressing through audit procedures? 
2. What other matters were discussed in the audit team brainstorming session on fraud risk?
3. What were the results of the independent auditors’ inquiries of management about fraud?
Did those inquiries precipitate anything that heightened the independent auditors’
professional skepticism?
4. What are the results of audit procedures designed to address the risk of management 
override of internal controls?
Additionally, the audit committee should be aware that the independent auditors are 
required to address the risk of management override of controls apart from any conclusions
regarding the existence of other risks.8 The audit committee members should recognize 
that the independent auditors have given extensive consideration to the risk of financial 
statement fraud and use the work performed by the independent auditors to the greatest
extent possible.9
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8 See Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA,
Professional Standards, vol. 1, AU sec. 316.41).
9 SAS No. 99 requires that the independent auditor, among other things, perform a discussion among engagement
personnel regarding the risks of material misstatement due to fraud and to identify the risks of material misstatement
due to fraud.
Communications With the Compensation Committee
The compensation committee of the board approves programs for executive compensation
and broad-based incentive plans. The audit committee’s understanding of these plans is
important when the plans may result in a heightened risk of fraudulent financial reporting 
primarily through creating excessive incentives or pressures to meet the plans’ targets.
In addition to reviewing the minutes of compensation committee meetings, it is important for
the audit committee to understand the performance incentives and possible unintended 
consequences that could lead to fraudulent financial reporting. For example, if company-wide
earnings-per-share is a major factor affecting compensation, or if stock or option awards are 
a significant element of compensation, management’s integrity can be put under stress if 
the company has difficulty meeting earnings targets. Additionally, when the compensation
committee evaluates management’s performance, best practices might include the 
compensation committee seeking the audit committee’s assessment of the entity’s internal
control environment, including the tone at the top.
Communications With Key Employees
The development of an information network with other key entity employees can be very 
beneficial. Focal points to consider include the general counsel, compliance or security 
director, human resources department, marketing or sales department, and business 
unit leaders.
The entity’s general counsel may be aware of potential violations of laws and regulations, 
violations of the entity’s code of conduct, or pressures that management may be experiencing.
Typically, the audit committee’s inquiry of the general counsel about any known pressures to
structure significant or unusual transactions designed to achieve financial targets may signal
the possibilities of fraud. Additionally, the general counsel generally would be asked about
major legal risks that the entity may be facing, which may create significant pressures to
engage in fraud. Specific questions to the general counsel can be structured by the audit
committee based on the environment and can be focused, as appropriate, on issues 
potentially affecting management integrity. Additionally, as a best practice, the audit committee
may consider having a dialogue with the entity’s external counsel. If such a dialogue is 
established, the audit committee may ask about any inquiries that management may have
made to the external counsel.
The human resources department may also play a key role in the audit committee’s information
network. Preemployment screening, monitoring, and employee discipline are all part of the
entity’s antifraud program. The exit interview process and resignation letters with respect to
employees in the accounting and finance function, employee surveys, and whistleblower 
hotline calls about human resources issues may be valuable sources of information regarding
management integrity and the tone at the top.
The audit committee will want to establish an open and comfortable reporting relationship with
the entity employee who has responsibility for compliance with laws and regulations and
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physical security. Frequent violations of laws or regulations may indicate a cavalier attitude by
management regarding rules and an increased risk of management override of internal controls.
Revenue recognition is almost always a fraud risk. Periodic conversations with the appropriate
marketing and sales personnel about company policies and controls over selling activities
may reveal pressures to meet revenue targets and possible inappropriate behavior. 
Marketing personnel may not fully appreciate the accounting significance of certain types 
of contract provisions—formal or informal. Interaction with the audit committee can help 
send an important message and further strengthen a tone at the top across the broader
organization. Additionally, sales-related activities have been the focal point of numerous 
financial statement frauds relating to distorted revenue or sales transactions. This type of 
risk is higher in certain industries and often can simply involve aggressive marketing rather
than fraud. Nonetheless, the misstatement of the financial statements can be significant.
Therefore, the audit committee may often find it beneficial to meet with appropriate 
marketing and sales personnel to determine whether any revenue recognition issues exist
and how management override could result in fraudulent revenue recognition.
Leaders of business units within an enterprise may face significant incentives or pressures
imposed by senior management to meet internal targets or other performance metrics. 
When business unit leaders perceive these incentives or pressures to be extreme, they 
may be motivated to engage in activities that may include the override of internal controls to 
fraudulently report financial results related to business unit operations. Business unit leaders
may also be aware of senior management activities to override internal controls performed 
at the business unit level for purposes of fraudulently reporting financial results at the 
consolidated level. 
Dialogue with business unit leaders about performance-based incentives and management-
imposed pressures may provide the audit committee with effective information about the 
risk of potential management override of internal controls to fraudulently distort financial 
performance. For example, periodic inquiry of key business unit leaders about their perceptions
of senior management pressure to meet performance targets and whether business unit 
leaders have been asked by senior management to engage in questionable activities to 
meet those targets may provide insightful information to the audit committee about the 
potential presence of management override of internal controls. 
Additionally, the layer of management below senior management may be the most likely to be
aware of management override and, therefore, establishing an open line of communication
with members of management one or two levels below senior management is important.
To identify information about potential financial statement fraud, the audit committee will need
to establish a confidential dialogue with key employees. For example, an audit committee
member who avails himself or herself of an opportunity to interact with key employees during
company meetings or functions may get a sense of employee attitudes toward the company.
The audit committee member may also learn about the tone at the top, employee knowledge
of antifraud programs and controls, including the whistleblower program, and other information
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that employees may be reluctant to communicate through the whistleblower program.
Whenever audit committee members are “out and about,” it may be beneficial to take 
advantage of the opportunity to talk to entity leaders. The important, and sometimes 
difficult, task is to do so without damaging relations with management by sending a strong
message of mistrust.
Conclusion
The risk of management override of internal controls is present in every entity. Although the
guidance provided in this document cannot guarantee that the audit committee will prevent,
deter, or detect fraud through management override of internal controls, the implementation of
these suggestions should result in more effective audit committee oversight of management.
Perhaps most importantly, this guidance may prevent the nightmare scenario of ControlCo
(see page 1) and the subsequent question, “Where was the audit committee?”
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Appendix
Suggested Audit Committee Procedures:
Strengthening Knowledge of the Business and 
Related Financial Statement Risks
As an audit committee addresses fraud risk in general and risk of management override in
particular, it is useful to consider frequently occurring fraud schemes and ask, “Can they 
happen here?” Evidence from fraud-related research may be helpful in this regard.1
Research has found that the most frequent types of management fraud involved fictitious or
premature revenue recognition. These frauds have occurred, for example, by management
overriding or circumventing controls to record sales not based on firm orders to buy or not
based on the true contract terms and conditions. For goods requiring shipment, shipments
may then have been held or directed to an intermediate location, or the recorded sales may
have been cancelled in a subsequent period. True contract terms and conditions hidden or
falsified by management have involved side agreements, future or continuing seller obligations,
rights of return, and cancellation and refund provisions. Using related parties has been 
another method used by management to circumvent or override controls and recognize 
fictitious revenue or to prematurely recognize revenue.
Research has also found that another frequent type of management fraud involved overstated
assets and understated expenses and/or liabilities. For these management may have exploited
accounting estimates and, for example, undervalued allowances for bad debts, loan losses,
or inventory reserves, failed to recognize or underestimated asset impairments, misstated
merger-related reserves, or simply failed to accrue liabilities.
Additionally, as the audit committee evaluates the entity and entity management, it can be
helpful to ponder the questions in this appendix related to the three elements of the “fraud 
triangle”: incentives or pressures, opportunities, and attitudes or rationalizations. These
queries can be particularly helpful in structuring an effective brainstorming session. Answers
to these questions can also provide focus for planning additional steps designed to control
the risk of management override of internal controls. Some of these additional steps can be
undertaken by the audit committee. Other follow-up assessment steps can be delegated to
internal or external auditors. A positive answer to any of the following questions does not 
necessarily imply that fraud has occurred. Rather, a positive answer indicates that a heightened
risk of fraud may exist and further evaluation by the audit committee may be prudent.
1 These examples are based on a study by Sarah Bonner, Zoe-Vonna Palmrose, and Susan Young, “Fraud Type and
Auditor Litigation: An Analysis of SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases.” The Accounting Review, vol.
73, no. 4 (October 1998): 503-532.
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Incentives or Pressures on Management
1. Is the entity’s financial stability or profitability threatened by economic, industry, or entity
operating conditions, such as (or as indicated by):
— High degree of competition or market saturation, accompanied by declining margins?
— High vulnerability to rapid changes, such as changes in technology, product 
obsolescence, or interest rates?
— Significant declines in customer demand and increasing business failures in either the
industry or overall economy?
— Operating losses making the threat of bankruptcy, foreclosure, or hostile takeover 
imminent?
— Recurring negative cash flows from operations or an inability to generate cash flows
from operations while reporting earnings and earnings growth?
— Rapid growth or unusual profitability, especially compared to that of other companies 
in the same industry?
— New accounting, statutory, or regulatory requirements?
2. Does excessive pressure exist for management to meet the requirements or expectations
of third parties due to the following:
— Profitability or trend level expectations of investment analysts, institutional investors,
significant creditors, or other external parties (particularly expectations that are unduly
aggressive or unrealistic), including expectations created by management in, for 
example, overly optimistic press releases or annual report messages? 
— Need to obtain additional debt or equity financing to stay competitive—including
financing of major research and development or capital expenditures?
— Marginal ability to meet debt repayment or other debt covenant requirements?
— Perceived or real adverse effects of reporting poor financial results on significant 
pending transactions, such as business combinations or contract awards?
3. Is management’s personal financial situation threatened by the entity’s financial performance
arising from the following:
— Significant financial interests in the entity?
— Significant portions of compensation (for example, bonuses, stock options, and 
earn-out arrangements) being contingent upon achieving aggressive targets for stock
price, operating results, financial position, or cash flow? (Note: management incentive
plans may be contingent upon achieving targets relating only to certain accounts or
selected activities of the entity, even though the related accounts or activities may not
be material to the entity as a whole.)
— Personal guarantees of debts of the entity?
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4 Is there excessive pressure on management or operating personnel to meet financial 
targets set by the board of directors or management, including sales or profitability 
incentive goals, budgets, or publicized forecasts or projections?
5. Are earnings expected to be “managed” at the subsidiary or division level, creating 
pressures on lower-level managers to meet higher-level management expectations?
6. Is there a perception of adverse consequences on lower-level managers if subsidiaries 
or divisions fail to exceed or fall short of budgeted, projected, or forecasted results?
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Opportunities Management Can Exploit
1. Does the nature of the industry or the entity’s operations provide opportunities to engage
in fraudulent financial reporting that can arise from the following:
— Significant related-party transactions not in the ordinary course of business or with
related entities not audited or audited by another firm?
— A strong financial presence or ability to dominate a certain industry sector that allows
the entity to dictate terms or conditions to suppliers or customers that may result in
inappropriate or non-arm’s-length transactions?
— Assets, liabilities, revenues, or expenses based on significant estimates that involve
subjective judgments or uncertainties that are difficult to corroborate?
— Significant, unusual, or highly complex transactions, especially those close to year end
that pose difficult “substance over form” questions?
— Significant operations located or conducted across international borders in jurisdictions
where differing business environments and cultures exist?
— Significant bank accounts or subsidiary or branch operations in tax-haven jurisdictions
for which there appears to be no clear business justification?
— Significant accounting system changes, particularly the implementation of new, complex
systems, or where control effectiveness was not adequately considered?
— Major structural changes, such as acquisitions or spin-offs, that might have affected
internal controls creating the likelihood of financial statement error?
2. Are significant estimates used in the annual or quarterly financial reporting process 
unrealistic or inconsistent with actual historical results or with the performance of other
entities in the same industry?
3. Is there ineffective monitoring of management as a result of the following:
— Domination of management by a single person or small group (in a nonowner managed
business) without compensating internal controls?
— Ineffective oversight over the financial reporting process and internal controls?
4. Is there a complex or unstable organizational structure as evidenced by the following:
— Difficulty in determining the organization or individuals that have controlling interest in
the entity?
— Overly complex organizational structure involving unusual legal entities or managerial
lines of authority?
— High turnover of senior management, counsel, or board members?
5. Are internal control components deficient as a result of the following:
— Inadequate monitoring of internal controls, including automated controls and controls
over interim financial reporting (where external reporting is required)?
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— High turnover rates or employment of ineffective accounting, internal audit, or 
information technology staff?
— Ineffective accounting and information systems including situations involving reportable
conditions?
6. Are there indications that the qualifications and capabilities of the finance or accounting
organizations and key personnel need significant improvement?
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Incentives or Pressures on Management
Attitudes or Rationalizations Exhibited by Management
1. Is there any evidence of ineffective communication and support of the entity’s values 
or ethical standards by management or the communication of inappropriate values or 
ethical standards?
2. Is there any evidence of nonfinancial management’s excessive participation in or 
preoccupation with the selection of accounting principles or the determination of 
significant estimates?
3. Is there a known history of violations of securities laws or other laws and regulations, 
or claims against the entity or its senior management, alleging fraud or violations of 
laws and regulations?
4. Is there excessive interest by management in maintaining or increasing the entity’s stock
price or earnings trend?
5. Is there a practice by management of committing to analysts, creditors, and other third
parties to achieve aggressive or unrealistic forecasts?
6. Has management failed to correct known reportable conditions on a timely basis in the
past or during the current year’s audit?
7. Has management exhibited an interest in employing inappropriate means to minimize
reported earnings for tax-motivated reasons?
8. Have there been attempts by management to justify marginal or inappropriate accounting
on the basis of materiality?
9. Is the relationship between management and the current or predecessor auditor strained,
as exhibited by the following:
— Frequent disputes with the current or predecessor auditor on accounting, auditing, or
reporting matters?
— Unreasonable demands on the auditor, such as unreasonable time constraints regarding
the completion of the audit or the issuance of the auditor’s report?
— Formal or informal restrictions on the auditor that inappropriately limit access to people
or information or the ability to communicate effectively with the board of directors or
audit committee?
— Domineering management behavior in dealing with the auditor, especially involving
attempts to influence the scope of the auditor’s work or the selection or continuance of
audit personnel assigned to the engagement?
10. Has management failed to identify business risks on a timely basis or failed to adequately
monitor identified risks?
11. Has management been unwilling to address—on a timely basis—issues that could result
in significant financial statement adjustments or adverse disclosures?
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12. Have management, internal auditors, or the independent auditors exhibited a less-than-
diligent attitude regarding the entity’s antifraud programs and controls?
13. Are disclosures and other information in Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations overly optimistic or inconsistent with the
audit committee’s knowledge of operations, the industry, or the entity’s performance? 
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